The Linkages Between Migration and Security

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Contents

I. Abstract

II. Introduction: The Linkage Challenge

III. Matters of Meaning:
A Framework for Tracking Migration-Security Linkages
The Security Calculus
The P-Factor
Mapping Migration

IV. The Linkage Process: Interconnections between Migration and Security
Missing Migration
State Structures
Institutional Capacities
Key Propositions

V. Major Studies and Gaps in Knowledge
Major Studies
Gaps in Knowledge
Internet Resources & Knowledge Networking

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I. Abstract

The challenge of ‘linkages’ is to determine what we know and what we do not know about connections between population movements and the security of states. Also relevant is to separate what matters; and how, what does not, and why. We propose a ‘security calculus’ to help clarify the linkages to migration.

Transcending the interface of migration and security is the role of institutional capacity. The institutions of the state provide are significant mediators between demography and security. The distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ state is useful.

To simplify, at issue is how the state discharges its institutional (and where relevant its constitutional) responsibilities, and whether migrants are included or excluded from the pool of populations served.

Electronic resources on migration and security - available through MIT's Global System for Sustainable Development (GSSD) - represent added sources of knowledge that still remain to be effectively utilized. GSSD is an adaptive and evolving global knowledge system dedicated to sustainable development based on distributed networking principles and practices. Since global problems are invariably complex, they require a multidisciplinary global approach for analysis, decision, and policy. This need is especially relevant to migration and security.

II. Introduction: The Linkage Challenge

The challenge of ‘linkages’ is to determine what we know and what we do not know about connections between population movements and the security of states. Also relevant is to separate what matters; how, what does not, and why. On the one hand, it is apparent that considerable work has been done that appears to bear on these linkages, but there are few studies that address these head on. On the other hand, there are notable barriers to cumulative knowledge and sustained scientific inquiry shaped in large part by the very nature of the subject at hand - migration and security.

Matters of definition, however contention, are central to the linkage task and provide a necessary entry point for this analysis. However trite that might seem, the fact remains that some empirically based truisms define the nature of the definitional problem itself. In the domain of mobility, these are captured by the following observations:

- What you see depends on how you look at it
Who counts defines who is counted
What is counted depends on who counts, how, and why.

In the domain of security, the companion truisms include:

One’s security may be another’s insecurity
Strategies designed to create security may actually enhance insecurity
Security may be ‘objective’ but in the last analysis it is ‘in the eye of the beholder’ i.e., ‘subjective’.

Superficial as these ‘sound bites’ might appear, they do capture some puzzles that require systematic inquiry. Given the increasing politicization of ‘migration’ world politics - and by definition the salience of politics in ‘security’, matters of definition are central, not peripheral: Clarifying key concepts involves requires specificity of dimension, logic, metrics and measurement.

Accordingly, we begin first with the meaning of migration and of security, and then we turn to the interconnections. Far from being a simple (and seemingly pedantic exercise) it is the meanings assigned to these terms that capture the volatility that, under certain condition, may erode the very foundations of social order - at any level, and in any socio-economic context.

III. Matters of Meaning:

A Framework for Tracking Migration-Security Linkages

We start with the ‘security calculus’ -- proposing a way of capturing the key factors and processes that constitute the condition we refer to as security. While the level of analysis here is that of the nation-state in international relations, the fundamentals at hand may well be largely generic, whereby the idiosyncrasies and specifics of a situation are accounted for, and captured by, a common logic. The same applied to the dimensions of migration. At the onset we may be on relatively solid grounds. There appears to be an emerging consensus about the complexity of security, and about the multidimensionality of migration. Where the uncertainties are greatest, and the contentions more overwhelming, is about the nature of the intervening factors or, as we shall term these below, the ‘intermediation processes’.

2.1 The Security Calculus

The security calculus presented here is a derivative logic. It consists of fundamental relationships among constituent elements of the social order. We posit this calculus as ‘objective’, amenable to empirical (and measurable) assessment. It is then reasonable to juxtapose the ‘objective’ accounting to a ‘subjective’ one, i.e., in terms of the
meanings, interpretations, values and views ascribed to the calculus by different actors. This logic evolved over time, starting from the simple arms race equations, to more detailed specification of the causal logic, to a formulation of segments or sectors of security. See Nazli Choucri, "Environmental Flashpoints in the Middle East and North Africa", in Robert C. Chen, et al. eds. Consequences of Environmental Change, 1998.

This proposed calculus views security as a function of three interconnected imperatives that jointly yield one integrated and logical holistic. These imperative cover the domains of 1) military capacity and defense; 2) governance and government performance; and 3) structural and environmental viability.

**Military Security (MS)** refers to the conventional "defense" concerns connected to ensuring the sanctity of state borders and/or to the use of military instruments for the pursuit of state objectives. It is the ability of the state to defend itself from incursion, attack, or invasion. It is the ability to assure security from "outside" threats.

**Regime Security (RS)**, is used here as a governance concept that refers to the ability of the government and its institutions to discharge formal responsibilities and also to protect itself from domestic disorder, revolt or dissension.

**Structural Security (SS)** refers to the ability to protect the resilience of life-supporting properties - as well as prevailing sources of livelihood - from erosive pressures.

While two terms, MS and RS are self-explanatory and largely strategically defined constructs; the third, SS is not intuitively obvious. It refers to the ability to meet the demands of the population (P), given availability of resources (R) and the prevailing levels of technology (T) - in the context of a given environment (E). As we have indicated in other contexts, we view P, R, and T as ‘master variables’ that shape the contextual configuration of a country. The master variables can be construed as the basic building blocks of state power, capacity, and performance. See Robert C. North, War, Peace, Survival, 1990, esp. pp 119-130.

The resulting calculus of national security (NS) can be expressed as a simple identity:

$$NS = f(MS, RS, SS)$$

This identity leads to the following proposition: **a state is secure to the extent that all three dimensions or conditions for security are in place; and it is "insecure" to the extent that one or more conditions (or dimensions) of security are threatened or eroded. In practice, however, ensuring SS is akin to a "juggling act": if (or when) population growth leads to resource needs that exceed the prevailing technological capacity to meet the population’s demands and needs, then conditions for structural security are eroded. Of course, the underlying imperative (the dilemma) is to make sure that populations do not strain the system’s overall ecological, environmental, and life-supporting properties.**

Extending this logic, we formulate structural security as:
SS = f (P, R, T) / E

These identities are highly simplified representations of "realities." The specific functional form for this aggregate identity is an empirical question. Nonetheless, we do know that the right-hand terms are highly interdependent, "causally connected," and possible in conditions of "mutual hostage." For example, regime security is undermined to the extent that government is unable to perform its functions effectively (for example, by not managing its structural security). It may be also undermined by threats from the outside (i.e. military action). We also know that only when security of the borders is assured can attention be given to the management of structural conditions.

Framed thus, the security logic represents a baseline framework to indicate where migration may enter into the security calculus. So far it is a static accounting; we have not yet introduced the dynamic process, the sources of change - toward ‘more’ or ‘less’ security. But we can appreciate that the migration linkages enter this calculus through potential perturbations generated by the ‘population factor’. Since the P-factor is fundamental - pervasive in defining a social order - we need to recognize the parsimony and the power of the master variables. What happens to the security calculus when the P-factor is disturbed?

2.2 The P- Factor

In an earlier study we characterized the role of population in international interactions in the following forms: as a (a) parameter of a social situation, defining the actors, the contenders, and the nature of the contentions at the starting line; (b) multiplier of prevailing contentions, potential shaping new ones as the dynamics of interaction work their way through time; and (c) variable both shaping and shaped by the dynamics of the interactions at hand, and responding to both the parametric and the multiplier effects. For an early analysis see Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence, 1974. For an update a decade later see Nazli Choucri, Population and Conflict, 1984.

For a relatively more recent update see Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence, 1974. This distinction was the result of a comparative case study of 45 threats to security and violent conflicts in developing countries. This analysis provided a baseline for framing the population-conflict connections.

These forms of the P-factor are framed here in the aggregate. The 45 cases further supported the proposition that, at this level of aggregation, migration per se be characterized in the same way. Equally relevant is the companion result that the role and implications of the P-factor (and of migration) changes in the course of the evolution (or unfolding) of a conflict situation.
What, then, does population ‘do’ in (or to) the security calculus? What is it that people ‘do’ that engenders considerations of, or concerns for, security? Since population is not neutral with respect to its socio-economic context, there are some security-specific implications - transcending matters conventionally regarded as largely demographic, economic, or social.

Put simply: At a minimum people make demands and exert claims that elicit a political response. The demands and claims may or may not be specifically political in content. But as long as they are perceived as political, or routed through political channels, or transmitted through political mechanisms, they become in essence political. And, by necessity (if not tautology) these become political. If we trace the claims (and perceptions thereof) we would in fact be traveling through the politicization channels that transform population variables from demographic considerations to political ones.

More fundamentally, of course, people influence their natural environments in both direct and indirect ways. The claims that they make may, be close to the margin of survival (populations in rural China), or they may range all the way to potentials for large-scale environmental disturbances (urbanization in any society). But as people move, the net impacts on the environment (and on political spheres) are a function of their own attributes and behaviors as well as the attributes and institutions of the recipient state or society. This, then, leads us to the manifestations of migration. We now need to ‘unbundle’ the term and its characteristic features in order to clarify linkages to security.

2.3 Mapping Migration

Migration is a process. It refers to the movement of people across jurisdictions (both within and across sovereign states). The process can be characterized as an entire system of interactions (i.e., a migration system) every element of which requires specificity and ‘unbundling’ -- since both content and impacts are highly variable in both cause and consequences. For purposes of parsimony, we differentiate among attributes of the migrants, the transmission mechanisms for migration, the duration of mobility, and the motivation in terms of volition. Jointly, these features provide the contours of maps of migration.

What follows is a simple accounting to help specify how and why migration may matter. It is relevant to the issue of entry-point introduced above, namely how migration intersects with security, and where these intersections take place within the security-calculus. Migration might affect each of the dimensions of security (individually or jointly) with multiple transmission mechanisms and potential impacts. The challenge for both research and policy purposes is to reduce uncertainty about entry points, mechanisms, and impacts.

Attributes of Migrants
By necessity if not by tradition, the literature differentiates migrants and migration streams by key attributes. Salient among these are volume, skills, ethnicity, age, skills, legal status (and others). Each one of these seemingly clear attributes pose measurement challenges. Even the simple matter of numbers (‘how many’) requires some prior attention to each of the truisms noted in the Introduction above.

**Motivation & Volition**

Less ambiguous is the determination of volition - but only at the most aggregate level and under highly visible conditions. People move voluntarily (for a variety of reasons related to, and independent of, attributes per se). They may also be forced to move by agents of power using instruments of force. They become refugees. The causes of refugeeism are usually politically contentious as are the consequences. Managing the process itself is often also contentious. In the international community, ‘refugee’ is a legal status and one that may be advantageous relative to other forms of forced mobility, namely those that fall short of the criteria set by the international custom or law.

The absence of volition in migration (creating refugeeism) could also be generated by an erosion of life supporting properties in the home community - with or without the presumption of force and violence. Such mobility has been termed 'environmental refugeeism’. Then, too, the use of force and the instruments of violence may themselves erode environmental balances, reinforcing the process of mobility. It is easy how a vicious cycle is set in place.

**Transmission Mechanisms**

At this point the question of ‘how’ intersects directly the matters of ‘why’. People may move as the result of an individual decision, and move alone. Or there might be group mobility. Criteria of attributes and affinity (and distance) are often deemed sufficient to determine how people move. But there are also forms of organized mobility through official (or unofficial) institutional mechanisms, accompanied by various degrees of legality at both ends of the transmission process. Prominent among the organized forms are the ‘imports’ and ‘exports’ of labor tied to employment conditions (generally covered in the literature under the rubric of 'labor as a commodity’). In such cases transmission is related to status.

**Duration of Mobility**

Duration is conventionally defined as short or long term, a seemingly clear and simple distinction. Yet the impacts of mobility are itself closely connected to duration (as well as to attributes of the migrants). One of the least appreciated features of duration pertains to the long term consequences of short term mobility and, conversely, to the short term consequences of strategies designed to alter long term mobility streams.

In this connection, we are beginning to understand the operations of *multiplier effects of*
migration in both economic and political domains and, by extension, the connections to security we note further along. Put starkly, migration may place its own (endogenous) demands for added migrants. The first robust empirical studies of the multiplier effect were done by an interdisciplinary MIT team working on the Gulf Countries of the Middle East, focusing specifically on Kuwait. We see this multiplier most clearly in cases where meeting the (legitimate) demands of the migrants themselves requires added migration. Obviously, migrants are 'consumers' in the generic sense, but they are also 'voters' in the euphemistic sense, i.e., with or without formal political participation. It is the claims that they make -- or that they are perceived to make -- that renders them functional 'voters'.

When we consider the combined implications of affinity, employment, ethnicity, and duration, the complexities abound, but so do our understandings of the nuances shaped by matters of identity, affinity, and other "softer" social variables that define "us" versus "them." A point of entry into the security calculus takes place when "we" protect ourselves against "them."

**Types & Transformations**

The foregoing provides the building blocks for defining two added features of the migration system, (a) types of migrations, and (b) transformation of types. There is no dearth of typologies in the migration literature, but there are serious difficulties of convergence. Typologies are, invariably, based on some criteria and these are often applied with less consistency than is required for purposes of systematic inquiry. As a result, typologies have tended to be situation specific, thereby eluding principles of generalization.

What follows is an illustration of migration types defined by motivation: *why* people move, to what extent is this mobility *voluntary*, and what their resulting *status* might be. In those terms, several forms are noteworthy in their robustness. These are dominant examples that may not necessarily exhaust type possibilities:

- Migration for employment
- Seasonal mobility
- Non-legal migrants
- Religious pilgrims
- Permanent settlers
- Refugeeism as forced migration
- State-sponsored movements
- Brain drain and "reversals" of drain
- Forms of returneeism
- Environmental migration

This exercise is a reminder of the *relational* basis of migration. Contextual factors enter into the definition of migration types and are formalized with reference to the fact of jurisdiction and to the uses of the institutions of the state (at both ends of the migration stream). And this highlights the matter of jurisdiction-the defining condition for cross-
The transformation of migration is as much a change in status as it is an effective change in the role of the migrants - even through there appear to be no significant transformations in their attributes as initially understood. For example, a non-legal migrant may become a legal migrant in search of employment, and then possibly a permanent settler. (The case of Israel is particularly illustrative, but hardly unique). Refugees may be reclassified as migrants for employment. Returneeism may be viewed as (or confused with) new migration. And the possibilities go on. These contingencies create added difficulties in retaining consistency of measurement - who counts and who is being counted.

Crossing Borders

Territorial borders in international relations denote bounds of sovereignty. State borders are (1) man-made and partly protected, but they are also fallible; (2) they delineate the legitimate exercise of political authority; and (3) states, in principle, are autonomous in the exercise of authority within their jurisdictions - even though the impacts may be felt elsewhere. In practice, moreover, (4) states are seldom able to exercise their internal authority over external consequences as effectively as they desire; (5) they are generally unable to control access across their boundaries (of people, goods, and services) entirely - if at all; and (6) they cannot insulate or protect themselves effectively from actions of states in other jurisdictions. Extended from Nazli Choucri, "Introduction", in Nazli Choucri ed. Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses, 1993, esp. pp. 25-26.

Given that the reality of national borders - delineating limits of sovereign jurisdiction - is the defining factor of the international system at any point in time, we tend to assume that borders are known, fixed, and permanent. Under such conditions, migration means crossing borders. But these conditions can be "variables" in international politics; they are not always fully known, neither known, and necessarily fixed for all (even short) time, and hence not permanent.

What happens when borders move but people do not? When is there ‘migration’ in the absence of mobility?

The redrawing of maps is a reality of international politics. In the 19th Century political cartography of Africa was a central feature of colonial power interactions. And we have recognized that the resulting map is inconsistent with the affinities on the ground. In the 20th century, we have seen major case of 'jurisdictional re-engineering'. Among these, the demise of the Soviet Union triggered the most profound strategic changes for the global system as a whole. And the 'imperfections' of such re-engineering are attested to -- almost on a daily basis - by 'uprisings' in various parts of the new jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

What does changing borders mean for our understanding of population mobility? At a
minimum, the redefinition of boundary of the state has direct implications for the position of the legal status of the population - for individuals, for groups and for aggregate populations as relevant. This reality -- and all of the uncertainties that it entails - point directly to the intermediation processes and to the structures and contingencies that shape the linkages between migration and security.

IV. The Linkage Process:

Interconnections Between Migration and Security

3.1 Missing Migration

Since migration is defined as the movement of people across national boundaries -- an inter-state phenomenon - we would expect it to be addressed by students of international relations. Impressive in this connection is the extent of divergence between such expectations and the subjects usually covered in the field of international relations. It is even more glaring to note the absence of migration as a topic in graduate courses in the field and its practical non-existence in the 'text-books' literatures. A detailed survey of all major (and minor) texts we have undertaken in the early 1980's signaled this gap. These conclusions remain largely unchallenged. Prepared by Nazli Choucri for the Harvard-MIT Seminar on International Relations, co-chaired by Hayward Alker and Robert Keohane. (Unpublished paper)

Characteristically, international migration continues to be viewed as falling outside the bounds of the scholarly field of international relations. Even when the issues examined call for analysis of the security and sanctity of the state in world politics, we find little attention, if any, to the movement of people. And when migration is recognized, it is almost always in idiosyncratic terms - a case analysis - not in terms of generic theoretical underpinnings or attendant processes.

It is from studies of politics within states that we find the most empirically informed inquiries of causes and consequences of migration. But these are seldom addressed in relation to security. For this reason we now seek to focus on (a) state structures and regulations and (b) institutional capabilities and performance, and then summarize the implications the 'migration-security balance sheet'.

3.2 State Structures

In the interest of parsimony, we highlight only two features of state structures directly relevant to migration and security. One pertains to the physical structure of the state (size, demography, economic configuration, etc.) and the other to its defining regulation of populations (citizenship laws and the rules of access regulating entry and exit).

There are, as yet, no large-scale, empirically grounded comparative analyses of the relationship between mobility, security, and state structures. Some patterns are in
evidence, but the insightful interpretations are yet to be made. At a minimum it is reasonable to expect that demographic context matters, but precisely how we have not yet formed a consensus. Anecdotally, for example, one can characterize the 'extreme cases' whereby the social contract is contingent on a migrant population that is generally viewed with suspicion, excluded from politics, and viewed by the nationals as fundamentally threatening to the stability and security of the state. The Gulf States of the Middle East best reflect these features.

The rules of citizenship are generally a good indicator of the politicization of migration. Myron Weiner is credited for drawing attention to this point early on in the history of the Inter-University Seminar on International Migration, Cambridge, Mass. In fact, the rules themselves set the bounds of politics in terms of what can or cannot be done by migrant populations as well as the benefits available to them. Citizenship also defines 'demographic legitimacy' whereby only those who are citizens are effectively legitimate and operationally enfranchised. Few societies accord non-citizens rights similar to those of citizens. This pattern is the norm, not the exception. And it derives almost exclusively from the institution of citizenship, the single most powerful correlate of state sovereignty.

All else being equal, citizenship rules (i.e., acquisition by choice vs. ascription at birth) go a long way in setting the stage for the politicization of migration and linkages to security. Ascription formalizes demographic distinctions and reinforces divisiveness; it does not create a security threat, but it does crystallize the lines of contention.

If citizenship refers the rules by which people are recognized, categorized, and 'processed', the companion rules pertain to access. The state determines who enters and exists, and how. But implementation is contingent on state capacity. Access rules, by definitions, are designed to protect the state with the understanding that their violation undermines state security. At issue here is less the empirical condition of threat to security than the perceptions of threat. Returning to the P-factor, introduced in the security calculus above, rules of citizenship and of access are at an interface of the migration-security linkages.

3.3 Institutional Capacities

Transcending the interface of migration and security is the role of institutional capacity. The institutions of the state provide are significant mediators between demography and security. The distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' state is useful largely in highlighting an important distinction, but it does not address: 'strong' or 'weak' with respect to what? To simplify, at issue is how the state discharges its institutional (and, where relevant, its constitutional) responsibilities, and whether migrants are included or excluded from the pool of populations served.

The calculus here implies some ratio between the loads (or demands) on the state and its ability to manage these loads through institutionalized capabilities. Tracking the loads
Jointly, the rules of citizenship and access, and the institutional capacities help shape responses to migration and the connections to security. These are powerful mediators that render meanings to numbers, thus determining whether migrants are ‘wanted’ or ‘unwanted’, politically assimilated or segregated, and included or excluded from coverage by the prevailing social contract. This last observation highlights a key implication of mobility. Migration itself may, over time, provide the basis for changes in the social contract and when these changes are formalized they are manifested in rules of citizenship and of access. The history of the United States is an excellent (text-book) illustration of this point, as are public debates surrounding periodic changes in immigration policy.

3.4 Key Propositions

At the onset we took note of several truisms that capture conceptual and methodological challenges at hand. The propositions below derive from the logic presented above, relevant literature, and the evidence to date - however incomplete our assessments might be. At a minimum it can be read as a set of hypotheses for further inquiry.

- Migrants affect overall national security through impacts on any one or more of the constituent elements. The initial (politically visible) impacts are often via regime security. This is because when politicized, they may politicize both themselves and the local populations. Who politicizes whom and in what sequence is perhaps less trackable than is the fact of politicization.
- The politicization of migration evolves most often as a positive feedback, which if unmediated by dampening effects of institutions, reinforce the positive feedback and consolidate perceptions of divisiveness.
- The more resilient are the institutions of the state, the less likely will migration be, or become, a security issue. The less resilient the institutions, the more salient will be migration in the security calculus.
- Migration is seldom a proximate threat to security; but the security calculus points to the entry points that may trigger insecurity. The extent is contingent on the above plus the scope and scale of mobility.
- By the same token, the logic of feedback serves as a reminder that the loss of security - along any one or more of the core dimensions -- may itself serve to trigger added (or initiative new) migration.
- Migrant attributes (such as ethnicity, religion, age, skill composition, etc.) provide further logic for making migration more rather than less salient to security, reinforcing
the impacts of migration at the entry points in the security calculus as well as the resultant implications.

These are among the most likely (and potentially robust) generalizations. But they are illustrative at best, and most surely not exhaustive. Further, they do not address situations in which migration itself leads to alteration in the entire features of the P-factor and, by extension, the social contract and the state system.

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If citizenship refers the rules by which people are recognized, categorized, and ‘processed’, the companion rules pertain to access. The state determines who enters and exists, and how. But implementation is contingent on state capacity. Access rules, by definitions, are designed to protect the state with the understanding that their violation undermines state security. At issue here is less the empirical condition of threat to security than the perceptions of threat. Returning to the P-factor, introduced in the security calculus above, rules of citizenship and of access are at an interface of the migration-security linkages.

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The calculus here implies some ratio between the loads (or demands) on the state and its ability to manage these loads through institutionalized capabilities. Tracking the loads to capabilities ratio yields a rough rule of thumb about state performance, and the potentials for adjusting to the migration elements of the P-factor.

Jointly, the rules of citizenship and access, and the institutional capacities help shape responses to migration and the connections to security. These are powerful mediators that render meanings to numbers, thus determining whether migrants are ‘wanted’ or ‘unwanted’, politically assimilated or segregated, and included or excluded from coverage by the prevailing social contract. This last observation highlights a key implication of mobility. Migration itself may, over time, provide the basis for changes in the social contract and when these changes are formalized they are manifested in rules of citizenship and of access. The history of the United States is an excellent (text-book) illustration of this point, as are public debates surrounding periodic changes in immigration policy.

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- The politicization of migration evolves most often as a positive feedback, which if unmediated by dampening effects of institutions, reinforce the positive feedback and consolidate perceptions of divisiveness.
- The more resilient are the institutions of the state, the less likely will migration be, or become, a security issue. The less resilient the institutions, the more salient will be migration in the security calculus.
- Migration is seldom a proximate threat to security; but the security calculus points to the entry points that may trigger insecurity. The extent is contingent on the above plus the scope and scale of mobility.
- By the same token, the logic of feedback serves as a reminder that the loss of security - along any one or more of the core dimensions -- may itself serve to trigger added (or initiative new) migration.
Migrant attributes (such as ethnicity, religion, age, skill composition, etc.) provide further logic for making migration more rather than less salient to security, reinforcing the impacts of migration at the entry points in the security calculus as well as the resultant implications.

These are among the most likely (and potentially robust) generalizations. But they are illustrative at best, and most surely not exhaustive. Further, they do not address situations in which migration itself leads to alteration in the entire features of the P-factor and, by extension, the social contract and the state system.

V. Major Studies and Gaps in Knowledge

It is in the logic of the scholarly enterprise that criticism often dominates, obscuring cumulative insights and wisdom of sustained study. With this caveat, we point here to major works as well as the gaps in knowledge.

4.1 Major Studies

Given that migration-security linkage is a remarkably understudied domain of research, it is not surprising that the studies deemed major here are not necessarily migration-centered. But they all bear directly on the linkages at hand. These are:

- **The Environment-Flashpoints Project**: cross regional comparisons of the ways in which environmental factors may threaten the security of states by undermining the resilience of life supporting properties and eroding ecological balances. An extension of this work to highlight the specific role (if any) of migration in all its forms would be an important addition. Robert C. Chen, et.al. eds. *Consequences of Environmental Change - Political, Economic, Social*, 1998.

- **International Migration in Developing Countries**: cross region analysis of sources and consequences of migration with special reference to security considerations by scholars from, and drawing on scholarship in, the regions provides a more demographically informed view of the migration-security connections. Papers presented at the International Organization for Migration Conference on *Managing International Migration in Developing Countries*, Chaired by Reginald Appleyard, Geneva 1997.

- **MIT Demography and Security Project**: case studies delving into the ‘mechanics’ of how mobility may undermine security and/or be perceived as threatening the stability of the state. Generally qualitative rather than quantitative, with few exceptions, these studies generate ‘thick’ descriptions of case-specific conditions. Papers presented at the Conference on Demography and Security, MIT, organized by Myron Weiner, 1998.

Each of these are project-based in the sense that they represent the efforts of a large number of scholars, subjected to peer review, and provided the materials for discussion.
in conference contexts. As such they have been subject to scrutiny. Jointly they are the bases for many of the inferences drawn in this paper.

4.2 Gaps in Knowledge

There is much that we do not know. Suffice it to stress some critical needs. Central among these are:

- Preparation of a ‘state of the art’ review of migration-security linkages
- Determination of relevant baselines for both migration and security
- Formation of a coherent framework for assessing the evidence generated by case studies to date in the absence of ‘standardization’

- Undertaking select exercises in counterfactuals, i.e. "what would have happened if"..?

- Understanding the limits of existing metrics and validated studies

- Engaging in interdisciplinary, quantitative, falsifiable inquiries of migration-security connections

- Tracking and assessing how migration systems change in response to security concerns, and how security may alter perceptions as well as realities of migration.

4.3 Internet Resources & Knowledge Networking

Electronic resources on migration and security -- available through MIT’s Global System for Sustainable Development (GSSD) - represent added sources of knowledge that still remain to be effectively utilized. GSSD is an adaptive and evolving global knowledge system dedicated to sustainable development based on distributed networking principles and practices. Since global problems are invariably complex and require a multidisciplinary global approach for analysis, decision-making, and solution.

This characterization is especially relevant to migration and security. Uses of any one of the system’s several search engines yield a "return" of roughly 187 discrete, quality controlled, pre-selected www sites on these two issues. For a review of the conceptual foundations for GSSD click on "Using GSSD". For a detailed specification of the content structure for the concepts of ‘migration’ click on "Guide to Core Concepts" in "Using GSSD". For the conceptual issues surrounding ‘security’, click on "Conflict and Warfare" in "Guide to Core Concepts". A careful review of their content will yield important insights as yet unrecognized. This is especially relevant to the challenges at hand since imperatives of security often dictate assessments and responses that must take place in what is, in effect, "real time." (See http://gssd.mit.edu).

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